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Abstract
Critics of Islam often frame anti-Islamic positions as a defense of tolerance 
against intolerance, and of equality against inequality. Islam, for this perspec-
tive, poses challenges for the ideological integration of Muslim immigrants 
in Western societies. This paper examines Canadian Muslims’ opinions about 
same-sex marriage. The analysis suggests that Canadian Muslims, as a group, 
do have distinctively negative opinions about same-sex marriage, but that 
there is substantial and systematic variation in opinions about this issue within 
the Muslim-Canadian community. Indeed, it is religiosity in general, rather 
than Islam in particular, that generates negative opinions about gay marriage. 
Exposure to the Canadian context, and especially postsecondary education, 
largely undoes the distinctiveness of Canadian Muslims’ opinions about this 
issue.
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1. Introduction
In January 2007, the town of Hérouxville, Québec, Canada drafted a series 
of resolutions aimed at prospective immigrants. The most controversial 
resolution prohibited the stoning of women in public. “Nous considérons 
que les hommes et les femmes sont égaux et ont la même valeur,” the docu-
ment proclaims, reafffĳ irming the community’s basic commitment to the 
fundamental rights of women, including their right to walk unaccompanied 
in public, attend school, and operate a vehicle (Municipalité de Hérouxville, 
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certainly unusual in its candor (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008). But it was 
not unusual in its form. Critics of Islam in Canada and across the Western 
world often frame anti-Islamic positions as a defense of tolerance against 
intolerance, and of equality against inequality (Akkerman, 2005, 2010; Betz 
and Meret, 2009; Ehrkamp, 2010; Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens, 2010; 
Razak, 2008; Shachar, 2000). Acceptance of sexual diversity in particular, 
which is a very recent phenomenon in Western countries, is a core tenet of 
a new “cultural citizenship” in democratic societies that is often invoked 
against Muslims and against Islam (Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens, 
2010; see also Fassin, 2010).
Most of the research on Muslim immigration is focused on the European 
context, where levels of Muslim immigration, and the political backlash 
against it, are far more extensive than in the Canadian case (Adida, Laitin 
and Valfort, 2010; Bleich, 2003, 2009; Bevelander and Otterbeck, 2010; Con-
nor, 2010; Ehrkamp, 2010; Fekete, 2008; Fetzer and Soper, 2003; Scheepers, 
Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2006; 
Shadid, 1991; Sniderman et al., 2000; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Zolberg and 
Litt Woon, 1999). Debates about Muslim immigration, however, are increas-
ingly important to Canada. The size of the Canadian Muslim population 
more than doubled between the 1991 and 2001 censuses, and this growth 
has continued apace. Worldwide population and migration patterns mean 
that Muslims will comprise an increasing share of immigrants to Canada 
for the next several years. By 2030, the number of Muslims in Canada is 
estimated to triple, from 940 thousand to 2.7 million, or 6.6 percent of the 
national population (Pew Research Center, 2011).
Canada has the second highest per-capita immigration rate in the OECD, 
and the proportion of foreign-born (and non-British) citizens has never 
fallen below 13 percent in the country’s 144 year history (Chui, Tran and 
Maheux, 2007). Indeed, multiculturalism is so entrenched in Canada that 
many consider it a signature characteristic of the country’s political culture 
(Eliadis, 2007). In the 2006 World Values Survey, less than 3 percent of 
Canadians indicated that they did not want “people of a diffferent race” as 
neighbors; less than 2.5 percent said the same thing about “immigrants,” 
and fewer still said the same about “people of a diffferent religion” (European 
Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 2010). Even so, 
Muslim immigrants in particular are often singled out for the supposed 
incompatibility of Islam with core liberal values, especially regarding 
homosexuality and the rights of women (Razak, 2008). These arguments 
appear to be resonating in Canadian public opinion. More than two thirds 
of Canadians perceive an “irreconcilable” conflict between Islamic and 
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Western societies (Leger Marketing Research, 2011), and, in the World Values 
Survey, nearly 12 percent of Canadians, and nearly one in four Quebec-
ers, did not want Muslims as neighbors (European Values Study Group 
and World Values Survey Association, 2010). Indeed, less than half of all 
Canadians hold a positive perception of Muslims (Jedwab, 2011). In this 
respect, the Canadian public opinion environment resembles those in many 
European countries, including the Netherlands (Mepschen, Duyvendak 
and Tonkens, 2010: 965).
This paper examines the level and drivers of Canadian Muslims’ opinions 
about the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. The recognition of 
same-sex marriage by the Parliament of Canada in 2005 is among the sig-
nature liberal achievements in Canadian politics in the past half-Century. 
This achievement did not happen all of a sudden. It was the culmination of 
a decades-long pattern of political activism and social movement politics, 
as well a series of legal, political and public opinion shifts regarding gays 
and lesbians. In the 1982 World Values Survey, a majority of Canadians, 51 
percent, expressed the view that homosexuality was “never justifĳ iable;” 
that fĳ igure fell to 37 percent in 1990, 26 percent in 2000, and 20 percent in 
2006. Nowadays, a majority of Canadians (61%) support same-sex marriage, 
and an overwhelming majority (85%) support at least some form of legal 
recognition for same-sex couples (Ipsos, 2011). Nonetheless, the recognition 
of same-sex marriage rights was staunchly opposed by the leaders of major 
religious groups in Canada–including Catholic, Muslim, Jewish and other 
leaders–and this opposition remains a legitimate conservative position 
in Canadian political discourse. In this respect, opinions about same-sex 
relationships are a high bar to use in assessing the extent to which people’s 
opinions are “compatible” with a liberal cultural environment. 
Drawing an analytical boundary around the category “Muslim” risks 
privileging from the outset explanations that draw attention to the lone 
characteristic that all Muslims, by defĳ inition, share in common: Islam. 
As a group, however, Muslims are distinctive from other Canadians, and 
indeed from other immigrants and religious groups, in more than simply 
their religious convictions. There are diffferent “proportionalities” of people 
with certain characteristics inside of the category “Muslim” than there are 
outside of this category. The core fĳ inding of this paper is that the treatment 
of Muslims as a monolithic social group masks variations within the Muslim 
community in terms of characteristics that are associated in systematic 
ways, for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, with public opinion about liberal 
political issues, and, in particular, with opinions about same-sex marriage.
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The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The next section 
examines the characteristics and opinions of Canada’s Muslim community. 
This analysis suggests that Muslim-Canadians do indeed stand out as a 
group for their negative opinions about same-sex relationships, but that the 
explanation for this distinctiveness is unclear. The third section proposes 
and tests two plausible explanations for the distinctiveness of Muslims, and 
summarizes data that allow for tests of these hypotheses. The “religiosity 
hypothesis” attributes conservatism among Muslims to Islam, whereas 
the “foreign socialization hypothesis” suggests that many Muslims bring 
with them the conservatism of the countries from which they emigrated. 
These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, but they do generate diffferent 
implications. The fourth section tests these implications systematically. This 
part of the analysis draws on a large web-based public opinion survey of 
Canadian voters. Section fĳ ive, the conclusion, discusses the implications of 
the results for the framing of the debate surrounding Muslim immigration. 
The core fĳ indings are, fĳ irst, that it is religiosity in general, and not Islam 
in particular, that generates opposition to same same-sex marriage; and 
second, that a Canadian socialization, and not simply secularization, undoes 
these opinions. There appears to be nothing about a commitment to Islam in 
particular that generates or preserves, more than other religions, opposition 
to same-sex relationships.
2. Profĳile of Canadian Muslims
The overwhelming majority of Muslim-Canadians are foreign-born. The 
top left-hand panel in Figure 1 highlights the relative proportions of major 
religious groups that were born in Canada and abroad (Statistics Canada, 
2001). The remainder of the panels summarize, for the immigrants within 
each religious group, their distributions in terms of their region of birth and 
length of residence in the country. Canadian Muslims are overwhelmingly 
recent immigrants. At the time of the Census, 72 percent of Muslims were 
foreign-born, compared to just over 18 percent of the Canadian popula-
tion as a whole. Two-thirds of Muslim immigrants had arrived to Canada 
within 10 years of the census, and more than 40 percent had arrived within 
fĳ ive years. The comparable fĳ igures for immigrants as a whole were 34 and 
18 percent, respectively. Canadian Muslims also tend to immigrate from 
specifĳ ic regions of the world. Fully 90 percent of Muslim immigrants to 
Canada arrive from the Middle East (35%), South Asia (27%), and Africa 
(25%), and just six percent arrive from Europe and East Asia. By contrast, 
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fewer than one in six non-Muslim immigrants arrive from Africa, the Middle 
East, and South Asia, and the majority of immigrants to Canada are from 
European (40%) and Eastern Asian (13%) countries. Muslims therefore 
difffer from most other religious groups in that they are overwhelmingly 
immigrants, and they difffer from most other immigrant groups in that they 
are overwhelmingly recent immigrants and from South Asia, the Middle 
East and Africa.
Figure 1 Immigration Status of Major Religious Groups in Canada  
Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census of Canada.
Figure 2 summarizes in a broad cross-national perspective public opinion 
about homosexuality. The y-axis corresponds to the national average of 
respondent positions in the two most recent waves of the World Values 
Survey (1999-2006) on a question which asks them to situate their views 
about homosexuality from a low of 1 (“is never justifĳ iable”) to a high of 10 
(“is always justifĳ iable”). The x-axis summarizes the country’s score on the 
UN Human Development Index (United Nations Human Development 
Programme, 2011). The colors and shape of the points correspond to difffer-
ent regions of the world, and the size of the points reflects the size of the 
Muslim population in each country. The LOESS smoother summarizes the 
relationship between level of HDI and public opinion about homosexuality.
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Figure 2 Public Opinion about Homosexuality in Comparative Perspective  
Sources: World Values Survey, 1996-2006; Human Development Index, 2011; Pew Research Center, 2010.
Two fĳ indings emerge from Figure 2. First, as Inglehart and Norris (2003) 
fĳ ind, public opinion in Muslim majority countries is invariably negative 
toward homosexuality. The larger points are clustered toward the low end of 
the y-axis. Fully 99 percent of Jordanians and Bangladeshis responded that 
homosexuality was “never” justifĳ iable, as did 96 percent of Pakistanis, 93 
percent of Algerians, 91 percent of Indonesians, 88 percent of Iranians, and 
79 percent of Turks. The comparable fĳ igures among non-Muslim countries 
are not in the general vicinity of these levels. Indeed, using the percent-
age of a country’s Muslim population to predict public hostility toward 
homosexuality accounts for about a fĳ ifth of the variation of the points in 
the fĳ igure.
Yet, second, opinions about homosexuality are powerfully related to 
a country’s score on the UNDP’s Human Development Index. Certainly, 
this basic fĳ inding is consistent with existing accounts of value change in 
postindustrial societies (Inglehart, 1997). But it also raises questions about 
the extent to which the prevalence of Islam rather than level of socioeco-
nomic development accounts for the distinctiveness of Muslim countries. 
Indeed, opinion in Muslim majority countries is hardly more hostile toward 
homosexuality than is opinion in other countries at comparable levels of 
HDI, or in the same regions of the world. Public opinion in African countries, 
for example, is unanimously negative about homosexuality, regardless of 
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the proportion of the Muslims in the country. 96 percent of Zimbabweans 
and 90 percent of Ugandans–both countries with small Muslim popula-
tions–indicated that homosexuality was never justifĳiable. From this vantage 
point, notice that the position of Muslim majority countries in Figure 2 is 
not much lower–and is in some cases higher–than the line which depicts 
the relationship between HDI and opposition to homosexuality. Taking 
into account the level and non-linear efffect of HDI reduces by two-thirds 
the magnitude of the relationship between the proportion of Muslims in 
a country and the country’s average level of opposition to homosexuality. 
This relation-ship is only barely signifĳ icant statistically (t = -2.2). In short, 
Muslim countries do not appear to stand out, or at least not by much, from 
other countries at similar levels of socioeconomic development.
Taken together, there are strong reasons for supposing that Muslim-Ca-
nadians will tend to express a negative opinion toward same-sex marriage. 
Most Muslim-Canadians are recent immigrants from areas of the world 
where there is virtually unanimous opposition to homosexuality. Indeed, 
the prevalence of liberal attitudes toward homosexuality is a rather recent 
phenomenon in Canada, and if not for drastic changes in Canadian public 
opinion during the 1980s–which very few Muslims were in the country to 
experience–the level of support for gay rights in Canada would resemble 
nothing like it does today.
3. Public Opinion about Same-Sex Marriage
This part of the analysis draws on two large public opinion polls of the 
Canadian electorate taken immediately after the 2006 and 2011 federal 
elections (Ipsos, 2006, 2011). These surveys are, for present purposes, two 
“opt-ins” away from randomization. Respondents opt-in fĳ irst, in efffect, to 
the election, and they opt in second to the survey. Relative to their shares 
of the Canadian population, men and immigrants are under-represented in 
these surveys. Men comprise 38 percent of the sample and 49 percent of the 
Canadian population. Immigrants make up 21 percent of the population, 
but just 11 percent of the sample. Older people are overrepresented. The 
mean age of survey respondents is 53, compared to a mean age of 37 in the 
Canadian population as a whole, and 46 among the voting-age population. 
These diffferences are due in part to the facts that these are surveys of the 
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An important advantage of these data, however, is that the sample sizes 
are very large. The 2006 survey has 36 003 respondents, including 160 Mus-
lims. The 2011 survey has 39 261 respondents, including 250 Muslims. Surveys 
of this size permit reliable statistical analyses of minority subgroups, such 
as Muslims, that are statistically invisible in other surveys. Moreover, both 
surveys ask respondents for their opinions about same-sex marriage. These 
question wordings, outlined in Table 1, are not identical, but they are suf-
fĳ iciently similar to permit a pooling of the data on these questions, and 
thus a further increase of the sample size of minority sub-populations. 
Indeed, the answers of respondents to these questions are very similar at 
both time-points. In 2006, 53 percent of respondents supported same-sex 
marriage, compared to 35 percent that supported civil unions, and a further 
13 percent that supported neither of these. In 2011, 61 percent supported 
same-sex marriage, 25 percent civil unions, and 14 percent were opposed 
to any form of recognition.
Table 1  Survey Items on Same-Sex Marriage
Year Question Wording Options
2006 Which comes closes to your views about 
gay and lesbian couples, do you think:
1.  They should be allowed to legally marry;  
2.   They should be allowed to legally form civil unions, 
but not marry; 
3.   There should be no legal recognition of their 
relationships
2011 What is your view on same-sex 
marriage?
1. Favour same-sex marriage; 
2.  Oppose same-sex marriage, but would accept 
same-sex civil unions; 
3. Oppose entirely same-sex marriage
Source: Ipsos, Election Exit Poll, 2006/2011.
Figure 3 outlines how respondents from diffferent religious groups answered 
these questions about same-sex marriage. The lighter bars on the left side 
of the fĳ igure correspond to the proportion of each group that supports 
full-fledged marriage rights for gays and lesbians, and the darker bars on the 
right correspond to the proportion that opposes to all forms of recognition. 
The middle bars represent the proportions favoring civil unions.
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Figure 3 Opposition and support for Same-Sex Relationships 
Source: Ipsos, Election Exit Poll, 2006/2011.
Respondents with no religion expressed the highest levels of support for 
same-sex marriage. Less than fĳ ive percent of those with no religion op-
posed any form of recognition of same-sex relationships, and 78 percent 
supported same-sex marriage. The comparable fĳ igures for the next closest 
group, Jewish respondents, were 13 and 70 percent, respectively. The results 
are altogether diffferent, however, among Muslim respondents. Muslims 
stand out from other religious groups in Canada for their level of opposi-
tion to same-sex marriage. Indeed, Muslims are the only group for whom 
the proportion opposing any form of recognition for same-sex couples, 44 
percent, is larger than the proportion, 32 percent, that supports same-sex 
marriage. Protestants are the next closest group in terms of opposition to 
gay marriage. Even then, however, there are more than two Protestants that 
support same-sex marriage for every one Protestant that opposes all forms 
of recognition (45% vs. 20%). Muslims, in short, are the only one of these 
religious groups wherein there is a very substantial level of opposition to 
any form of recognition of same-sex relationships.
4. Data and Hypotheses
Both surveys include measures for immigration status, frequency of reli-
gious observance, and level of formal education. The 2011 survey includes 
additional questions about length of residence in the country, region of 
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origin, and a battery of questions about religiosity. The variables and ques-
tion wordings are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2  Variables and Question Wording
Year Name Question Wording Categories
2006 IMMIGRANT Were you born in Canada? 1. Immigrant  
0. Native
CHURCHATT Other than on special occasions...how often 
did you attend religious services or meetings 
in the last 12 months?
3. + Once a week  
2. Once a week  
1. Once a month+  
0. Less often
EDUCATION Education Level 6. Graduate degree  
5. University degree  
4. Some university  
3. College diploma  
2. Some college  
1. High School  
0. No High School
2011 IMMIGRANT Were you born in Canada? 1. Immigrant  
0. Native
YEARSCDA In what year did you come to Canada? 5. Before 1959  
4. 1960-9  
3. 1970-9  
2. 1980-9  
1. 1990-9  
0. 2000-11
BIRTHPLACE Where specically did you move from? 1. Middle East  
2. South Asia  
3. Africa  
4. East Asia  
5. Americas+  
6. Europe
CHURCHATT How often do you attend church, temple, 
mosque services at your place of worship?
Same as 2006
RELIGIMP In your life, would you say religion is very 
important, somewhat important, not very 
important, or not important at all?
3. Very  
2. Somewhat  
1. Not very  
0. Not at all
PRAYERS Do you believe in a God that answers prayers? 1. Yes  
0. No
HOLYBOOK Do you believe that the holy book of your 
religion...is the revealed word of God?
1. Yes  
0. No
EDUCATION Education Level Same as 2006
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The religiosity hypothesis generates two expectations. On the one hand, 
the distinctiveness of Muslims may be attributable to their higher level of 
religiosity (Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009; Boswell, 1980; Rimmerman, Wald and 
Wilcox, 2000). In this case, Muslims are not distinctive because of Islam 
per se, but because religiosity is associated with heightened opposition to 
same-sex marriage, and Muslims are more religious than other Canadians. 
Controlling for level of religiosity should therefore reduce the magnitude 
of the diffference between Muslims and non-Muslims. On the other hand, 
however, the distinctiveness of Muslims may be attributable to the efffects 
of Islam in particular (Hekma, 2002). In this scenario, religious Muslims 
stand out from other religious Canadians because a commitment to Islam 
is associated with more negative opinions about same-sex marriage than is 
a commitment to other religions, such as Catholicism and Protestantism.
If the foreign socialization hypothesis is correct, then the gap between 
Muslims and non-Muslims is attributable primarily to the distinctive 
opinions of Muslims socialized in foreign countries. Formal education may 
also play a role. The cause of the empirical relationship between formal 
education and liberal values is a matter of some debate (Abramson and 
Inglehart, 1994; Dutch and Taylor, 1993; Jennings and Niemi, 1981; Warwick, 
1998). Nevertheless, Weil (1985) fĳ inds that this relationship is conditional on 
the prevalence of liberal democracy in a country. Thus, the efffects of educa-
tion may difffer for people that receive their education in Canada than for 
people that receive their education in non-liberal countries. If this is correct, 
then a high level of formal education may decrease opposition to same-sex 
marriage among Canadian-born Muslims–who would have received their 
education in Canada–but not among foreign-born Muslims–who would 
have received most, if not all, of their formal education in Africa, the Middle 
East, or South Asia. The muted efffects of formal education on the opinions 
of foreign-born Muslims, moreover, could contribute to the distinctiveness 
of Muslims as a group in their opinions about same-sex marriage.
The place to begin is with the data. Figure 4 summarizes for each 
religious group the basic bivariate relationship between level of religious 
attendance, on the x-axis, and opposition to all forms of legal recognition 
of same-sex relationships, on the y-axis. The size of the points reflects the 
proportion of each religious group at each level of religious attendance.
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Figure 4  Opposition to Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, by 
Religious Attendance 
Sources: Ipsos , 2006 and 2011.
A few fĳ indings emerge in Figure 4. First, notice the size of the data points 
at diffferent levels of church attendance. The vast majority of Jews (80%) 
Catholics (76%), Protestants (66%), and Other Religions (81%) attend 
religious ceremonies only infrequently – less than once a month. Only 10 
percent of Jews and 15 percent of Catholics attend religious ceremonies 
on a weekly basis, and less than 3 percent attend religious ceremonies 
more than once a week. The comparable fĳ igures are somewhat higher, but 
nonetheless quite low, for Protestants (24%, 8%) and Hindu/Sikhs (19%, 
5%). For Muslims, however, nearly half (45%) attend a religious ceremony at 
least once a month, and fully one in fĳ ive attend more than once a week. In 
this respect, Muslims are disproportionately represented among the higher 
levels of religious attendance where opposition to same-sex relationships 
is especially pronounced.
Notice, however, that the gap between people who rarely and regularly 
attend religious ceremonies is less pronounced among Muslims than among 
the members of any other religious group. Indeed, the 24 percentage point 
diffference between Muslims who attend religious ceremonies more than 
once a week, and the Muslims who attend less than once a month, is dwarfed 
by the 45 point spread between Protestants in these categories, and the 39 
and 37 point spreads among Hindu/Sikhs and Other Religions, respectively. 
159 COCHRANE
 THE EFFEC TS OF ISLAM, RELIGIOSIT Y, AND SOCIALIZATION
Notably, the Muslim respondents that stand out the most from the other 
religious groups are not the Muslim respondents that attend religious 
ceremonies on a regular basis. With the exception of Catholics and Jews, 
people who frequently attend religious ceremonies are generally quite 
negative, at least compared to other Canadians, in their opinions about 
the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. In this regard, Muslims 
are not much diffferent. Rather, where Muslims are diffferent is in the level 
of opposition to same-sex relationships that exists among Muslims who 
attend religious ceremonies only rarely, if at all. These Muslims oppose at 
more than three times the rate of the infrequent attenders among other 
religions the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. There are a few 
potential explanations for this fĳ inding, not least of which is that religious 
attendance may be a less efffective indicator of religious commitment among 
Muslims than among non-Muslims. Section Four examines this possibility 
in greater detail.
Figure 5 summarizes for native-born and foreign-born respondents 
within each religious group the relationship between level of education and 
opposition to the legal recognition same-sex relationships. The horizontal 
lines on each panel represent the averages for each sub-group.
Figure 5  Opposition to Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, by Level of 
Education 
Sources: Ipsos , 2006 and 2011.
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On the whole, 19 percent of foreign-born Canadians oppose any form of 
recognition of same-sex relationships, compared to 13 percent of native-born 
Canadians. This basic relationship persists among all religious groups, but 
it is especially pronounced among Muslims. Nearly half of all foreign-born 
Muslims, 49 percent, oppose any recognition of same-sex relationships, 
compared to 34 percent among native-born Muslims.
Level of education is consistently and inversely associated with op-
position to same-sex relationships. More highly educated respondents 
express higher levels of support for same-sex relationships than do their 
counterparts with lower levels of formal education. Notice in particular the 
trends among Muslims. Interestingly, the magnitude of the efffect of formal 
education on opinions about same-sex marriage is by a considerable extent 
largest among native-born Muslims (Coef = -.366, se = .119); yet, the efffect is 
altogether non-existent among foreign born Muslims (Coef = -.023, se = .08). 
Foreign-born Muslims are just as likely to oppose same-sex relationships, 
regardless of their level of education. And while native-born Muslims with 
a university degree harbor opinions that are virtually indistinguishable 
from the opinions of all other Canadians with a university degree, the 
opinions of native-born Muslims with less than postsecondary education 
are indistinguishable from the opinions of foreign-born Muslims.
5. Multivariate Analysis
This stage of the analysis is confĳined to the 39 261 respondents in the 2011 
survey, which contains more precise measures of religiosity, country of 
birth, and length of exposure to the country. The indicators of religiosity, 
summarized in Table 2, are church attendance, importance of religion, 
whether the Holy Book is the revealed word of God, and whether God 
answers prayers. Interestingly, church attendance is the weakest load-
ing variable on this factor for all religions; it is especially weak among 
Muslims, and doubly weak among Muslim women. This suggests that 
religious attendance is a less efffective indicator of underlying religiosity 
among Muslims than among other religious groups, and it may explain the 
fĳ indings, uncovered above, that Muslims stand out in their opinions among 
gay marriage more strongly among non-Mosque-attenders than among 
regular Mosque-attenders. Even so, the remaining three items–HOLYBOOK, 
GODPRAYERS, and RELIGIMP–constitute a highly reliable and single di-
mensional measure of religiosity that applies equally to all of the religious 
groups. After standardizing these variables with a mean of 0 and standard 
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deviation of 1, they haven been weighted by their factor loadings and added 
together to form a three item index of religiosity (α = .84), which has itself 
been standardized, for ease of interpretation, with a standard deviation of 
1 and a minimum value of 0.
5.1. Drivers of Opinions about Same-Sex Marriage
The dependent variable is comprised of three categories. Support for 
same-sex marriage is the fĳ irst category (1), support for civil unions is the 
second category (2), and opposition to all forms of recognition is the third 
category (3).These categories are not perfectly ordinal. The parallel regres-
sion assumption is violated. Even so, closer analysis indicates that these 
diffferences are questions of magnitude rather than of direction. Some 
variables do somewhat more heavy lifting in predicting the distinction 
between the fĳ irst and second categories than between the second and third, 
and some variables do more between the second and third than between 
the fĳ irst and the second. The variables that predict opinions between the 
fĳ irst and the second categories, however, also predict, in the same direction 
and to approximately the same extent, opinions between the second to 
the third. The violation of the parallel regression assumption is therefore 
not so severe to warrant transforming the dependent variable into two 
categories, or of employing less parsimonious regression models suited 
to nominal dependent variables. Missing data are not a problem for this 
stage of the analysis. The survey required respondents to provide answers 
about most sociodemographic information–including gender, education, 
immigration status, and country of birth. Even so, the survey did provide 
opportunities for respondents to not answer some questions. Only 507 
observations, however, or one percent of the sample, are missing on religion, 
and fewer still, 233, are missing on religiosity. In efffect, the covariates in 
the model are complete. Where there is missing data is on the question of 
same-sex marriage, where 2773 observations, or seven percent of the sample, 
are missing. Given that the covariates are complete, however, using these 
variables to impute values of the dependent variable can add no additional 
information, at least to the extent that the pattern of missing values on the 
dependent variable is random (Little, 1992). To the extent that these patterns 
are not random, moreover, multiple imputation does not solve the problem. 
Further analysis indicates that the patterns of missing data on same-sex 
marriage are largely random. Using the full battery of independent vari-
ables to predict missing observations on the question of same-sex marriage 
adds just a tenth of a percentage point to predictive accuracy of the naive 
prediction that no cases are missing.
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5.2 Religiosity Hypothesis
Table 3 outlines in three stages the results of an Ordinal Logistic Regression 
model that uses religion and religiosity to predict respondent positions 
on same-sex marriage. The fĳ irst bloc of the model assesses the impact of 
respondent religion, controlling for age and gender. The second bloc controls 
for level of religiosity, and the third bloc, an interaction model, controls for 
possible diffferences in the efffect of religiosity across religious groups. All 
of the models include age and gender because these variables are related 
simultaneously with level of religiosity and with opinions about same-sex 
marriage. In all of the models, the largest religious group, Catholic, is the 
reference category. Thus, the coefffĳ icients for the diffferent religious groups 
reflect a comparison to Catholics. Moreover, the use of interaction terms 
in the third model means that it is not possible to compare directly in this 
model the direct efffects of religion and religiosity, given that their values 
are conditional in the interaction model on the values of the other variables 
with which they interact.
Table 3   Religion, Religiosity and Opinions about Same-Sex Marriage
Bloc 1 Bloc 2 Bloc 3
Age  0.023*  
 (0.001)
 0.020*  
 (0.001)
 0.021*  
 (0.001)
Male  0.582*  
 (0.022)
 0.796*  
 (0.023)
 0.796*  
 (0.023)
Protestant  0.353*  
 (0.025)
 0.282*  
 (0.025)
 -0.388*  
 (0.063)
Muslim  1.753*  
 (0.140)
 1.367*  
 (0.142)
 0.188  
 (0.503)
Jewish  -0.902*  
 (0.101)
 -0.666*  
 (0.105)
 -0.724*  
 (0.200)
Hindu/Sikh  0.135  
 (0.181)
 0.092  
 (0.187)
 -1.217*  
 (0.576)
Other  -0.358*  
 (0.061)
 -0.129*  
 (0.063)
 -1.259*  
 (0.156)
None  -1.046*  
 (0.035)
 -0.006  
 (0.040)
 -0.265*  
 (0.056)
Religiosity  0.832*  
 (0.015)
 0.639*  
 (0.023)
Protestant.Religiosity  0.366*  
 (0.032)
Muslim.Religiosity  0.587*  
 (0.221)
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Bloc 1 Bloc 2 Bloc 3
Jewish.Religiosity  0.003  
 (0.116)
Hindu/Sikh.Religiosity  0.728*  
 (0.287)
Other.Religiosity  0.684*  
 (0.083)




 1.884*  
 (0.049)
 3.186*  
 (0.057)




 3.351*  
 (0.052)
 4.778*  
 (0.061)
 4.490*  
 (0.065)
N  35948  35948  35948
pseudo R2  0.064  0.118  0.121
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05  
Source: Ipsos 2011.
Given the results of the earlier analysis, it is not surprising that Muslims 
stand out in the fĳ irst bloc of the model. Compared to the sample as a whole, 
and holding gender and age constant at their mean level, the predicted 
probabilities indicate that Muslims are three times less likely to support 
same-sex marriage (21% vs. 63%) and nearly four times more likely to op-
pose all forms of recognition for same-sex relationships (47% vs. 12%). The 
95 percent confĳidence intervals are in the vicinity of plus or minus fĳ ive 
percentage for Muslims and plus or minus a half a percentage point for the 
sample as a whole. For the next most conservative group, Protestants, 52 
percent support same-sex marriage, and only 18 percent oppose all forms of 
recognition. Protestants are signifĳ icantly less conservative than Muslims, 
but signifĳicantly more conservative than Jews, for example. Fully 79 percent 
of Jews support same-sex marriage rights, and just fĳ ive percent oppose all 
forms of recognition.
Introducing level of religiosity, in Bloc 2, substantially improves the fĳ it 
of the model. Muslim Canadians are more religious than non-Muslims. 
On the religiosity scale, which ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 2.6, the 
mean score for Muslims is 2.1 (sd = 0.7), which is more than a third of a 
standard deviation higher than the next closest group, Protestants (1.8, 
sd=.9), and more than two thirds of standard deviation higher than the 
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national average (1.4, sd=1). This contributes to the distinctive opinions of 
Muslims. According to these estimates, if Muslims were no more religious 
than other Canadians, then 33 rather than 21 percent of Muslims would 
support same-sex marriage, and only 29 rather than 47 percent would op-
pose all forms of recognition. On its own, religiosity accounts for about 36 
percent of the opinion gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in Canada.
This evidence supports one part of the religiosity hypothesis. It turns out 
that the higher level of religiosity among Muslims accounts for a sizeable 
portion of their distinctive positions about same-sex marriage. What is not 
clear, however, is whether Islamic religiosity generates to a greater extent 
than other kinds of religiosity opposition to same-sex marriage. This is 
the key assumption underlying arguments that single out Islam as a set of 
religious beliefs that generates illiberal opinions about gay rights.
The evidence in Bloc 3 provides limited support for this line of argument. 
This bloc of the model includes interaction terms for religiosity by religion. 
Bloc 3 improves the fĳit of the model, even taking account of the additional 
number of variables, but only marginally (LR χ2 = 200). Nonetheless, a number 
of relevant fĳindings emerge from this bloc of the model. The baseline category 
is Catholics. Given that these are interaction terms, the religiosity variable 
now represents the efffect of religiosity for Catholics; the Religion variables 
now represent the direction and magnitude of the diffference between each 
religious group and Catholics when the level of religiosity is at its lowest 
possible value; and in order to calculate the total efffect of religiosity for each 
religious group, one must add the coefffĳicient for Religiosity to the coefffĳicient 
of the interaction term for that particular group.
Notice that Muslims continue to stand out from the other groups–though 
not so much from Catholics–even when the level of religiosity is at its low-
est possible value. Protestants, Jews, Hindus and Sikhs, members of other 
religions and members of no religion are all more liberal than Catholics 
when level of religiosity is at its lowest possible value. Muslims, however, 
are not more liberal. Even so, notice as well that although the efffect of 
religiosity is larger among Muslims than among Catholics, it is not larger 
among Muslims than it is among Hindus/Sikhs and members of Other 
Religions; indeed, the efffect is not larger at statistically signifĳ icant levels 
among Muslims than among Protestants.
Figure 6 summarizes the key results of the regression model. The 
horizontal lines in Figure 6 correspond to the the average levels of support 
and opposition to same-sex marriage in the entire sample. The bars in the 
Figure represent the predicted levels of support and opposition to same-sex 
marriage among Muslims, but under diffferent scenarios about the level and 
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impact of Islamic religiosity. These scenarios are summarized along the 
x-axis. The leftmost scenario is the predicted level of support and opposition 
to same-sex marriage among Muslims under the assumption that both the 
level and efffect of religiosity among Muslims are constant at their observed 
levels among Muslims, controlling for age and gender. The second scenario 
reflects the same prediction, and also holds the level of religiosity constant 
at its observed level among Muslims, but in this case it adjusts the efffect 
of religiosity to its average level among all Canadians, rather than to its 
observed level among Muslims. And fĳ inally, the third scenario holds the 
efffect of religiosity constant at its observed level among Muslims, but adjusts 
the level of religiosity to its average level in the sample as a whole. Figure 
6 therefore makes it possible to compare the distinctive contributions of 
both the level and efffect of Islamic religiosity on the size of the opinion gap 
between Muslim and non-Muslim Canadians.
Figure 6  Muslim Opinions about Same-Sex Relationships, by Level and Efffect of 
Religiosity 
Sources: Ipsos , 2006 and 2011.
The main fĳ inding is that it is in large part the higher level of religiosity 
among Muslims, and not at all the efffect of Islamic religiosity in particular, 
that explains the opinion gap on same sex marriage between Muslims 
and non-Muslims in Canada. Notably, controlling for the efffect of Islamic 
religiosity does not reduce the size of the opinion gap between Muslims 
and non-Muslims. Muslims are just as diffferent from the national averages 
in the second scenario, when the efffect of Islamic religiosity is assumed to 
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be identical to the efffect of religiosity among all Canadians, as in the fĳ irst 
scenario, when the efffect of religiosity is set to the value observed among 
Muslims. The size of the opinion gap decreases substantially, however, 
when the greater level of religiosity among Muslims is taken into account.
5.3. Foreign Socialization Hypothesis
There are a few ways in which foreign socialization may influence opinions 
about same-sex marriage. First, it may influence these opinions directly. 
Recent immigrants to Canada who were born and socialized in regions 
of the world where there is widespread opposition to homosexuality may 
harbor negative opinions about same-sex marriage by virtue of their high 
levels of exposure to the opinion environments in their countries of origin, 
and their low levels of exposure to the opinion environment in Canada. 
Second, however, foreign socialization may also afffect opinions indirectly, 
through religiosity. If immigrants happen to be more religious than native-
born Canadians, then they may stand out for their opinions about gay 
marriage in part by virtue of their higher levels of religiosity. This would be 
an indirect efffect of foreign socialization, and it suggests that controlling 
for religiosity would mitigate to some extent the efffect of foreign birth and 
socialization on public opinion about gay marriage.
Closer analysis, however, rules out this second possibility. Immigrants 
are indeed more likely than native-born Canadians to attend religious 
services, but, intriguingly, they do not score higher than native-born 
Canadians on the three-item measure of religiosity (1.4 for native born vs. 
1.4 for immigrants). This non-fĳ inding applies equally to Muslims (2.1 for 
native born vs. 2.2 for foreign born). Moreover, the efffect of religiosity on 
opinions about same-sex marriage is equally as strong for native-born as it 
is for immigrant-Canadians–indeed, if anything, the efffects of religiosity 
are slightly stronger among the native-born than among immigrants. The 
pattern also applies for Muslims. In short, whatever impact foreign so-
cialization has on opinions about same-sex marriage, these efffects operate 
independently of the level and efffects of religiosity.
Table 4 replicates the analysis from Table 3, except in this case the vari-
ables in the third bloc of the regression model in Table 3–which examined 
diffferences in the efffects of religiosity across religious groups, and found 
that these diffferences had no impact on the distinctiveness of Muslims–are 
replaced by a diffferent set of variables which measure the region of the 
world from which the respondents emigrated. The six regional categories 
are Middle East, South Asia, Africa, East Asia, Americas+, and Europe. 
Native-born respondents are the reference category.
167 COCHRANE
 THE EFFEC TS OF ISLAM, RELIGIOSIT Y, AND SOCIALIZATION
Table 4    Religion and Region of Origin as Predictors of Opinions about Same-Sex 
Marriage
Bloc 1 Bloc 2 Bloc 3
Age  0.023*  
 (0.001)
 0.020*  
 (0.001)
 0.020*  
 (0.001)
Male  0.582*  
 (0.022)
 0.796*  
 (0.023)
 0.787*  
 (0.024)
Protestant  0.353*  
 (0.025)
 0.282*  
 (0.025)
 0.263*  
 (0.025)
Muslim  1.753*  
 (0.140)
 1.367*  
 (0.142)
 0.818*  
 (0.155)
Jewish  -0.902*  
 (0.101)
 -0.666*  
 (0.105)
 -0.757*  
 (0.106)
Hindu/Sikh  0.135  
 (0.181)
 0.092  
 (0.187)
 -0.491*  
 (0.199)
Other Religion  -0.358*  
 (0.061)
 -0.129*  
 (0.063)
 -0.199*  
 (0.063)
No Religion  -1.046*  
 (0.035)
 -0.006  
 (0.040)
 -0.050*  
 (0.041)
Religiosity  0.829*  
 (0.015)
 0.827*  
 (0.015)
Middle East  0.960*  
 (0.185)
South Asia  1.142*  
 (0.198)
Africa  0.835*  
 (0.168)
East Asia  1.210*  
 (0.105)
Americas +  0.326*  
 (0.074)




 1.884*  
 (0.049)
 3.186*  
 (0.057)




 3.351*  
 (0.052)
 4.778*  
 (0.061)
 4.812*  
 (0.061)
N  35948  35948  35948
pseudo R2  0.064  0.118  0.123
Standard errors in parentheses.   
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The introduction of country of birth variables improves somewhat the fĳ it 
of the model (LR χ2 = 325). More important for present purposes, however, 
are three results. First, immigrants, no matter their region of origin, are less 
supportive of gay rights than are native-born Canadians. All else equal, 65 
percent of native-born Canadians support same-sex marriage and just under 
10 percent oppose all forms of recognition. For immigrants, the comparable 
fĳ igures are 52 percent and 16 percent, respectively.
Second, however, region of origin plays a signifĳicant role in this equation. 
Immigrants from the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and East Asia are 
substantially more likely to oppose same-sex marriage rights than are 
immigrants from American and European countries. Holding all other 
variables constant at their mean level, 54 percent of immigrants from 
European countries support same-sex marriage, but only 42 percent of 
immigrants from the Middle East and 37 percent of immigrants from South 
Asia express this view.
Third, and most important, notice by following the coefffĳ icient for 
Muslims across all three blocs of the model that controlling for region of 
origin reduces the distinctiveness of opinions among Muslims. It reduces the 
size of the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims by about 10 percentage 
points, even allowing for the higher levels of religiosity among Muslims. 
Country of origin closes fully a quarter of the gap between Muslims and 
other Canadians in support for same-sex marriage, and a third of the gap 
in opposition to all forms of recognition. Controlling simultaneously for 
religiosity does even more to reduce this gap. If Muslims were as religious 
as other Canadians, and if they tended to be born from the same regions 
of the world, then these estimate suggest that the distinctiveness of their 
opinions about same-sex marriage would be reduced from a 43 point spread 
to an 18 point spread in the case of support for same-sex marriage, and from 
a 34 point spread to a 9 point spread in the case of opposition to all forms of 
recognition. Accounting for level of religiosity and country of origin reduces 
by nearly 60 percent the overall diffferences between Muslims and non-
Muslims across all three categories of opinion about same-sex marriage.
Muslims difffer from other Canadians, however, not only in their immi-
gration status and country of origin, but also in the recency of their arrival to 
Canada. Table 5 examines the impact among immigrants of exposure to the 
Canadian context. The fĳ irst bloc of the model includes covariates for length 
of residence in Canada and for length of residence squared. In this model, 
the coefffĳ icients for region of origin represent the efffects of each region, 
compared to native-born respondents, when length of exposure to the 
country is at its lowest possible value (0), which corresponds to immigrants 
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that have been in the country for less than ten years. The coefffĳ icient for 
Years in Canada, as well as Years in Canada squared, capture the efffect 
of exposure for each additional decade of an immigrant’s residence in 
the country, on the approximately accurate assumption that the efffect is 
constant across all categories of immigrants, regardless of their religion or 
region of origin.
Table 5   Length of Residence in Canada as a Predictor of Opinions about Same- Sex 
Relationships
Bloc 1 Bloc 2
Gay Marriage
Age 0.022* (0.001) 0.020* (0.001)
Male 0.785* (0.024) 0.820* (0.024)
Protestant 0.265* (0.025) 0.279* (0.026)
Muslim 0.716* (0.156) 2.481* (0.581)
Jewish -0.752* (0.106) -0.641* (0.107)
Hindu/Sikh -0.596* (0.201) -0.612* (0.203)
Other Religion -0.204* (0.063) -0.211* (0.064)
No Religion -0.048 (0.041) -0.049 (0.041)
Religiosity 0.826* (0.015) 0.815* (0.015)
MiddleEast 1.497* (0.194) 1.822* (0.214)
SouthAsia 1.653* (0.207) 1.995* (0.227)
Africa 1.430* (0.182) 1.762* (0.205)
EastAsia 1.810* (0.127) 2.092* (0.158)
Americas 1.081* (0.111) 1.303* (0.140)
Europe 1.357* (0.101) 1.522* (0.128)
Years in Canada -0.436* (0.064) -0.458* (0.064)









_cons 3.297* (0.059) 2.828* (0.065)
cut2
 _cons 4.905* (0.061) 4.449* (0.067)
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Bloc 1 Bloc 2
N 35948 35948
pseudo R2 0.124 0.130
Standard errors in parentheses.   
* p < 0.05 
Source: Ipsos 2011.
Figure 7 summarizes the impact of length of residence in Canada on im-
migrants’ opinions about same-sex relationships. The x-axis corresponds 
to length of residence in Canada, and the y-axis represents the predicted 
level of support for same-sex marriage among immigrants, when all other 
variables in Bloc 1 of the model are held constant at their mean level for 
immigrants. The size of the points represents the proportion of Muslim 
immigrants (circles) and all immigrants (squares) at each category of length 
of residence. The three horizontal lines, beginning from bottom to top, 
represent the average level of support for same-sex marriage among Mus-
lims, among immigrants, and among the Canadian population as a whole.
Figure 7  Support for Same-Sex Marriage Among Immigrants, by Length of 
Residence in Canada 
Source: Ipsos 2011.
Two key fĳ indings emerge from this Figure. First, immigrants with high 
levels of exposure to the Canadian context are more favorably disposed 
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toward same-sex marriage, and the efffect of exposure is non-linear: a one 
unit increase in level of exposure has its greatest efffect at lower levels 
of exposure, and virtually no efffect at higher levels. The efffect of each 
additional year of exposure wanes over time.
Second, notice by looking at the size of the points the uneven distribution 
of Muslims vis-a-vis other immigrants across categories of exposure. Com-
pared to other immigrants, Muslims are disproportionately concentrated in 
the lower values of length of residence in Canada, where levels of support 
for same-sex marriage are very low. They are virtually non-existent in the 
highest categories of length of residence in Canada, where levels of sup-
port for same-sex marriage are considerably higher. Indeed, 60 percent of 
Muslim immigrants are concentrated in the fĳ irst two categories of length 
of exposure, and 95 percent are concentrated in the fĳ irst four categories. By 
comparison, just 21 and 51 percent of non-Muslim immigrants are within 
these categories. This diffference contributes somewhat to the higher levels 
of opposition to same-sex marriage among Muslim immigrants. Controlling 
for length of residence in Canada by setting the values of this variables con-
stant at its mean level for all immigrants reduces the opinion gap between 
Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants by about 6 percentage points, even 
allowing for the higher levels of religiosity among Muslims and their greater 
likelihood of having arrived from Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.
Although taking account of appropriate statistical controls reduces the 
magnitude of the diffferences between Muslims and non-Muslims, Muslims 
remain distinctive from other groups of Canadians, even when level of 
religiosity, region of origin, and length of residence in Canada are all taken 
into account. It is helpful to fĳ igure out which Muslims are driving this 
diffference. Bloc 2 of Table 5 suggests important heterogeneity within the 
Muslim-Canadian community. This bloc of the model introduces level of 
education into the equation, as well as a battery of interaction terms that 
allow for the possibility that the efffects of education may vary between 
native-born and foreign-born Canadians, between Muslims and non-
Muslims, and between native-born and foreign-born Muslims.
Figure 8 plots the predicted levels of support and opposition to same-sex 
relationships for diffferent groups of Canadians at diffferent levels of formal 
education, when all other variables are held constant at their mean level.1 
The values on the x-axis represent level of education, and the positive and 
negative values on the y-axis represent the predicted probabilities of support-
ing same-sex marriage and opposing all forms of recognition, respectively. 
The white lines represent the predicted levels of support and opposition 
for Canadians as a whole, and the black lines represent predicted levels for 
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Muslims. These shaded regions corresponds to the 95 percent confĳidence 
intervals of the estimates. The left-hand panel compares across educational 
categories foreign-born Muslims to Canadians as a whole, and the right-hand 
panel compares native-born Muslims to Canadians as a whole.
Figure 8 Support for Same-Sex Marriage Among Muslims, by Level of Education 
Sources: Ipsos 2011.
The Figure summarizes two key fĳ indings. First, as expected, a higher level 
of formal education is associated with increased support for same-sex 
relationships. This pattern applies among all Canadians–including im-
migrants–and it applies among native-born and foreign-born Muslims. 
Indeed, the inclusion of education as a predictor of opinions about same-sex 
relationships generates a notable improvement in the fĳ it of the model.
Second, however, notice that the efffect of education on opinions about 
same-sex marriage is more pronounced among native-born Muslims than 
among foreign-born Muslims. As level of education increases, the size of the 
gap between foreign-born Muslims and all Canadians remains unchanged, 
but it closes quite considerably between native-born Muslims and all Ca-
nadians. The diffference between native-born and foreign-born Muslims in 
the rate of change across categories of education is substantively as well as 
statistically signifĳ icant.
Intriguingly, these patterns are not the result of diffferent levels of religi-
osity. There is no empirical relationship among Muslims between level of 
formal education and level of religiosity. These two variables are altogether 
unconnected to each other among Muslims (b=.02, p=.599), despite their 
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rather strong inverse relationship in the population as a whole (b = -.06, 
p=.000).
6. Conclusion
Canadians Muslims express less support for same-sex relationships than do 
members of other major religious groups in Canada. But there are reasons 
to question the extent to which Islam as a religion should be singled out 
as the cause of these opinions. Public opinion about homosexuality has 
undergone a drastic transformation in Canada over the past three decades; 
a transformation that most Muslims, unlike most other Canadians, were 
not in the country to experience. Indeed, the opinion environments in the 
regions of the world from which Canadian Muslims tend to emigrate are 
invariably hostile toward homosexuality, regardless of the proportion of 
Muslims in those countries.
The results of the analyses uncover some support for the religiosity 
hypothesis. Religiosity in general is associated with higher levels of opposi-
tion to same-sex relationships, and Muslims turn out to be more religious 
than other Canadians. There appears to be nothing peculiar, however, about 
Islamic religiosity. There is no evidence in these data that a commitment 
to Islam generates more negative opinions about same-sex relationships 
than does a commitment to other, more mainstream religions in Canada, 
including Protestantism.
The results are similarly mixed for the foreign socialization hypothesis. 
Certainly, the greater likelihood of foreign-birth among Muslims, combined 
with their disproportionate representation among immigrants from Af-
rican, Middle-Eastern and South Asian countries, goes some way toward 
explaining their distinctive opinions about same-sex marriage. Opinions 
about same-sex relationships are particularly distinctive among Muslim 
immigrants, and they are more distinctive among Muslim immigrants that 
have arrived to Canada relatively recently than they are among the very 
small number of Muslim immigrants that have been in the country for a 
number of years. Yet, the story of opinions about same-sex marriage cannot 
be told without religiosity, and level of religiosity appears to decline very 
slowly among Muslim immigrants to Canada. Moreover, the Canadian Mus-
lims that stand out the most for their opinions about same-sex relationships 
are native-born Muslims with low levels of formal education. To what extent 
the efffect of education is a product of self-selection or of socialization–or, 
indeed, of something else–is a question that is beyond the reach of the 
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tools employed in this analysis. Nonetheless, it suggests that although the 
distinctiveness of Muslim-Canadian opinions is particularly pronounced 
among foreign-born Muslims, it is not confĳined to them.
These results point to important sources of heterogeneity with the 
Muslim Canadian community. Muslims are not a single monolithic group. 
Indeed, native-born Muslims with a university education are far less distinc-
tive from other Canadians with a university education than native-born 
Muslims with a very low level of education are from other similarly edu-
cated Canadians. There appears to be something about exposure to formal 
education in Canada–as opposed to exposure to formal education in the 
countries from which Muslims emigrate–that is associated with a marked 
liberalization of Muslim-Canadian opinions about same-sex marriage. This 
efffect, moreover, does not operate through religiosity. A higher level of 
education is not associated among Muslims with lower levels of religiosity.
To the extent that the results uncovered here are generalizable to other 
contexts, and to the extent that they stand up to replication using new data, 
the substantive conclusions may well be important for the broader debate 
about Muslim immigration in liberal societies. Muslim-Canadian opinion 
about same-sex relationships is not, fĳ irst and foremost, a story about Islam. 
Rather, it is primarily a story about religiosity and of immigrant integration 
more generally. To be sure, opposition to all forms of legal recognition of 
same-sex marriage is more common among Muslim-Canadians than among 
other Canadians. However, within this Muslim-Canadian community, 
this opposition is confĳ ined to those who were born in countries where 
opposition to gay rights is common– regardless of their level of formal 
education–and to those who were born in Canada but have no exposure 
to post-secondary education. Canadian-born Muslims with a university 
degree are no more opposed than other university-educated Canadians to 
the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. It seems that the school is 
more important than the Mosque as a source of Muslim-Canadian opinions 
about same-sex relationships.
More generally, the fĳ indings in this paper challenge the analytical utility 
of following the convention in political discourse that treats Muslims as a 
distinctive category whose aggregate properties are then associated with 
the lone characteristic–Islam–that defĳ ines the boundary for this group as 
a whole. Religiosity in general, rather than Islamic religiosity in particular, 
is associated with heightened opposition to same-sex marriage. Being born 
and raised in regions of the world where opposition to homosexuality is 
common is, for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, associated with opposition 
to same-sex relationships among recent immigrants, but the efffect wanes 
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over time with exposure to the new society. And the efffect of exposure to 
higher levels of education in the new society is powerfully and consistently 
associated with more liberal attitudes toward same-sex marriage; however, 
this association applies for second-generation immigrants more generally, 
rather than for Muslims in particular. The rapid cultural transformation 
in Canada around the issue of sexual orientation progressed, in less than 
two decades, from a point where sexual minorities were ostracized in 
public and private life to a point where the acceptance of sexual diversity is 
considered by many as a defĳining element of the country’s political culture 
and, indeed, as an “index of civilization” (Scott, 2009). This new political 
climate is often leveraged in Canada, as it is elsewhere, against Muslims. 
The results in this paper, however, suggest that there is nothing distinctive 
about Canadian Muslims when public opinion is examined from the vantage 
point of individual-level predictors of attitudes toward same-sex marriage.
Note
1. The region of birth variables for foreign-born Muslims are held constant at their aver- age 
level among all immigrants, thus setting to 1, in efffect, the constituent variable “immigrant” 
in the interaction terms for Muslim.Immigrant, Immigrant.Education, and Muslim.Im-
migrant.Education.
References
Abramson, P. and Inglehart, R. (1994). Education, security, and postmaterialism: A comment 
on Dutch and Taylor’s postmaterialism and the economic condition. American Journal of 
Political Science, 38(3):797–814.
Adamczyk, A. and Pitt, C. (2009). Shaping attitudes about homosexuality: The role of religion 
and cultural context. Social Science Research, 38(2):338–351.
Adida, C., Laitin, D. D., and Valfort, M.-A. (2010). Identifying barriers to Muslim integration in 
France. Proceedings of the National Academic of Sciences, 107(52):384–390.
Akkerman, T. (2005). Anti-immigration parties and the Defence of liberal values: The exceptional 
case of the List Pim Fortuyn. Journal of Political Ideologies, 10(3):337–354.
Akkerman, T. (2010). Women and children fĳ irst! Anti-immigration parties and gender in Norway 
and the Netherlands. Patterns of Prejudice, 41(2):197–214.
Betz, H.-G. and Meret, S. (2009). Revisiting Lepanto: The political mobilization against Islam in 
contemporary Western Europe. Patterns of Prejudice, 43(3):313–334.
Bevelander, P. and Otterbeck, J. (2010). Young people’s attitudes towards Muslims in Sweden. 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33(3):404–425.
Bleich, E. (2003). Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
176
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
CMS 2013, VOL. 1, NO. 1
Bleich, E. (2009). Where do Muslims stand on ethno-racial hierarchies in Britain and France? 
Evidence from public opinion surveys, 1988-2008. Patterns of Prejudice, 43(3):379–400.
Boswell, J. (1980). Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe 
from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press.
Bouchard, G. and Taylor, C. (2008). Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation. Report of the 
Commission de Consultation sur les Pratiques D’Accommodement Reliees aux Diffferencs 
Culturelles. Quebec, PQ: Government of Quebec.
Chang, L. and Krosnick, J. A. (2009). National surveys via rdd telephone interviewing versus 
the internet: Comparing sample representativeness and response quality. Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 73(4):641–678.
Chui, T., Tran, K., and Maheux, H. (2007). Immigration in Canada: A portrait of the foreign-born 
population, 2006 census. Statistics Canada, Catalogue no.97-557:1–37.
Connor, P. (2010). Contexts of immigrant receptivity and immigrant religious outcomes: the case 
of Muslims in Western Europe. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33(3):376–403.
Dutch, R. and Taylor, M. (1993). Postmaterialism and the economic condition. American Journal 
of Political Science, 37(3):747–779.
Ehrkamp, P. (2010). The limits of multicultural tolerance? Liberal democracy and media portray-
als of Muslim migrant women in Germany. Space & Polity, 14(1):13–32.
Eliadis, P. (2007). Belonging? Diversity Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada, chapter 
Diversity and Equality: The Vital Connection, pages 547– 559. Montreal, PQ: The Institute 
for Research on Public Policy.
European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association (2010). European and world 
values survey - microdata [computer fĳ ile]. Madrid, Spain and Tilburg University, Tilberg, the 
Netherlands: ASEP/JDS [producer]. Cologne, Germany: ASEP/JDS and GESIS [distributor].
Fassin, E. (2010). National identities and transnational intimacies: Sexual democracy and the 
politics of immigration in Europe. Political Culture, 22(3):507–529.
Fekete, L. (2008). Integration, Islamophobia and Civil Rights in Europe. London, UK: Institute 
of Race Relations.
Fetzer, J. S. and Soper, C. J. (2003). The roots of public attitudes toward state accomodation of 
European Muslims’ religious practices before and after September 11. Journal for the Scientifĳic 
Study of Religion, 42(2):247–258.
Hekma, G. (2002). Imams and homosexuality: A post-gay debate in the Netherlands. Sexualities, 
5(2):237–248.
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political 
Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2003). The true clash of civilizations. Foreign Policy, 135:62–70.
Ipsos (2006). 2006 election exit poll: microdata fĳ ile [computer fĳ ile]. Toronto, ON: Ipsos [producer]. 
Laurier Institute for the Study of Public Opinion and Policy [distributor], 2010/10/01.
Ipsos (2011). 2011 election exit poll: microdata fĳ ile [computer fĳ ile]. Toronto, ON: Ipsos [producer]. 
Laurier Institute for the Study of Public Opinion and Policy [distributor], 2012/07/01.
Jedwab, J. (2011). Groups and intergroup relations: Canadian perceptions. Online. Accessed July 
10, 2012.
Jennings, M. K. and Niemi, R. G. (1981). Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults 
and their Parents. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Leger Marketing Research (2011). A decade after September 11th 2001. Online. Accessed July 10, 2012.
Little, R, J. A. (1992). Regression with missing X’s: A review. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 87(420):1227–1237.
177 COCHRANE
 THE EFFEC TS OF ISLAM, RELIGIOSIT Y, AND SOCIALIZATION
Mepschen, P., Duyvendak, J. W., and Tonkens, E. H. (2010). Sexual politics, orientalism and 
multicultural citizenship in the Netherlands. Sociology, 44(5):962–979.
Municipalité de Hérouxville (2010). Normes de vie de la Municipalité de Hérouxville. Online. 
Accessed July 20, 2010.
Pew Research Center (2011). The future of the global Muslim population: Projections for 2010-2030. 
Online. Accessed February 15, 2011.
Razak, S. H. (2008). Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics. Toronto, 
ON: University of Toronto Press.
Rimmerman, C. A., Wald, Kenneth, D., and Wilcox, C. (2000). The Politics of Gay Rights. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M., and Coenders, M. (2002). Ethnic exclusionism in European countries: 
Public opposition to civil rights for legal migrants as a response to perceived ethnic threat. 
European Sociological Review, 18(1):17– 34.
Scott, J. W. (2009). Sexularism. Ursula Hirschmann Annual Lecture on Gender and Europe. Flor-
ence, IT: European University Institute.
Semyonov, M., Raijman, R., and Gorodzeisky, A. (2006). The rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in 
European societies, 1988-2000. American Sociological Review, 71(3):426–449.
Shachar, A. (2000). Should Church and State be Joined at the Altar? Women’s Rights and the 
Multicultural Dilemma. In W. Kymlicka, & W. Norman (Eds.) Citizenship in Diverse Societies 
(pp. 119–136). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Shadid, W. (1991). The integration of Muslim minorities in the Netherlands. International Migra-
tion Review, 25(2):355–374.
Sniderman, P. M., Peri, P., Figueiredo, R. J. P., and Piazza, T. (2000). The Outsider: Prejudice and 
Politics in Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Statistics Canada (2001). 2001 Census of Canada: public use microdata fĳile - individuals fĳile [com-
puter fĳile]. Revision 2. Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada [producer]. Data Liberation Initiative 
[distributor], 2006/04/26. (STC 95M0016XCB).
Strabac, Z. and Listhaug, O. (2008). Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multilevel analysis of 
survey data from 30 countries. Social Science Research, 37(1):268–286.
United Nations Human Development Programme (2011). The Human Development Report 2011. 
New York, NY: UNDP.
Warwick, P. (1998). Disputed cause, disputed efffect: The postmaterialist thesis re-examined. 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 62:583–609.
Weil, F. D. (1985). The variable efffects of education on liberal attitudes: A comparative-historical 
analysis of anti-Semitism using public opinion survey data. American Sociological Review. 
50:458–474.
Zolberg, A. R. and Litt Woon, L. (1999). Why Islam is like Spanish: Cultural incorporation in 
Europe and the United States. Politics & Society, 27(1):5–38.
About the author




CMS 2013, VOL. 1, NO. 1
 2013 Cochrane / Amsterdam University Press. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
